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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3294 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BALIR AKEEM STARKEY, 
 
            Appellant 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of  Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 3-09-cr-00391-001 
District Judge: The Honorable James M. Munley 
                            
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 18, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
and STEARNS, District Judge

 
 
(Filed: May 24, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
                              
                                                 

 The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the United 
States District Court of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
 
STEARNS, District Judge.  
 On December 13, 2007, Balir Akeem Starkey, together with his cousin and 
two other men, robbed Murphy’s Jewelers in Pottsville, Pennsylvania.  Starkey 
provided his companions with black t-shirts (used as masks) and gloves.  During 
the robbery, Starkey threatened Murphy’s employees with a pistol.  Starkey’s 
cousin assaulted the store manager.  The four men gathered up approximately 
$26,000 worth of diamond rings and fled in a rented getaway car. 
 Starkey was identified by FBI agents who recovered his fingerprints and 
traces of his DNA from the abandoned getaway car.  Confronted by the agents, he 
confessed to the robbery.  After negotiating a plea agreement with the government, 
Starkey pled guilty to a violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951.  He also 
agreed to cooperate with the government.  His assistance led to the indictment and 
conviction of his cousin. 
 At the August 9, 2011 sentencing hearing, citing Starkey’s substantial 
assistance, the government moved for a downward departure to a sentence of 66 
months.  The advisory Sentencing Guidelines Range (SGR) was pegged at 84 to 
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105 months.
1
  Starkey’s counsel joined the government’s motion.  The District 
Court refused to depart and sentenced Starkey to the minimum SGR term of 84 
months.  Starkey timely appealed his sentence.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
We review a district court’s sentencing decision for reasonableness under an 
abuse of discretion standard.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  In 
assessing the reasonableness of a sentence, we must  
first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural 
error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the 
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to 
consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based 
on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen 
sentence – including an explanation for any deviations from the 
Guidelines range. 
   
Id.  If “the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, [we] . . . then 
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed . . . .” Id.  The 
party challenging a sentence has the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness.  
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).   
Starkey attacks his sentence as procedurally flawed, arguing that the District 
Court did not adequately explain its reasoning in denying the jointly requested 
downward variance.
2
  Because, according to Starkey, the record does not reveal an 
                                                 
1
 Starkey did not object to the Probation Office’s calculation of the applicable 
SGR. 
2
 Starkey does not challenge the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. 
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explicit reason for Judge Munley’s refusal to depart, it does not reflect whether he 
gave “meaningful consideration” to the factor of substantial assistance.  See United 
States v. Charles, 467 F.3d 828, 831 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Cooper, 
437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 We read the record differently.  At the outset of the hearing, Judge Munley 
invited the parties to address the issue of a substantial assistance departure.  After 
hearing the government prosecutor’s 66-month recommendation, the more fulsome 
endorsement of a variance by Starkey’s counsel, and an apology from Starkey, 
Judge Munley stated that in determining an appropriate sentence he had given 
consideration to “the presentence investigation report, which I have studied – Mr. 
Starkey has written me a letter and – which he’s outlined his – his feeling with 
regard to the matter and his remorse – and the statements by [Starkey’s counsel] 
Mr. Young here this morning and Mr. Zubrod, [the] United States Attorney.”  App. 
78.  He further said that he intended to impose a sentence that would reflect “full 
consideration of all of the [§ 3553(a)] factors including the nature and seriousness 
of the offense, history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences 
that are available, advisory sentencing ranges and policies prescribed by the 
sentencing commission.”  Id. at 79.   
Turning first to the “nature and seriousness of the offense,” Judge Munley 
noted that Starkey had “brandish[ed] a firearm during the robbery while the two 
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others stole the merchandise” and that “[t]he owner of business was struck in the 
head and bound with duct tape.”  Id.  Next addressing “the nature and 
characteristics of the defendant,” Judge Munley described Starkey’s personal and 
family background, remarking that he “has served a considerable amount of time 
of imprisonment since the age of 17.”  Id. at 79-80. 
[His] criminal record consists of two aggravated felonies and three 
summaries and including . . . [a conviction] of robbery at the age of 17 
in 2003 and was sentenced as an adult to three and a half years to . . . 
seven years.  While on parole on this offense, he committed the 
instant federal offense. . . .  In 2008, that is subsequent to the time of 
this offense, he was convicted of distribution of cocaine and 
possession of a firearm. 
 
Id. at 80. 
 Judge Munley then took up the issue of a variance.  After expressing his 
respect for the prosecutor and defense attorney, he nonetheless denied the joint 
motion.  He explained: 
He – Mr. Starkey – he committed this robbery in December of 2007.  
Three or four months later in March of 2008, he was arrested for 
delivery . . . of cocaine and possession of a weapon.  So for his young 
years, 25[,] he’s – he spent a considerable amount of time incarcerated 
for serious felony convictions.  This fellow, Mr. Starkey, has a violent 
streak in him.  When we look at his prior record, the – that prior 
robbery, . . . the report indicates that there was people involved in it.  
There was a gun brandished and a knife involved, and someone placed 
a knife at someone’s throat.  And . . . the [] disorderly conducts again 
have – somebody get punched in the face and so on. 
 
And . . . it’s interesting to point out with that – into 2008, possession 
with intent to deliver and the firearms not to be carried without a 
license and resisting arrest charges, which – that incident police were 
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on routine patrol and they approached the defendant as he – for some 
reason, he fled on foot.  And subsequently, there was some plastic 
baggies containing cocaine retrieved and also – and also a loaded 25 
caliber Phoenix arm pistol was obtained in that incident . . . .  I’m very 
happy with the letter that I received from Mr. Starkey.  In that letter he 
talks about his family, his – his gaining a new perspective and outlook 
on his life and how he failed to take – take time to think about the 
long term mental or emotional damage that he could have cause 
people involved in these incidents.  One of the other incidents in this 
particular case was . . . Mr. Murphy at the jewelry store was bound up 
and . . . was struck in the head with what he believed was a pistol. 
 
Id. at 80-82. 
Judge Munley concluded with the observation that Starkey’s prior crimes 
“are very serious offenses, and I would be giving him more time if it were not that 
he’s presently serving the sentence” in Delaware County and “he’s going to serve 
this [sentence] consecutively . . . .”  Id. at 82.  He then sentenced Starkey to a term 
of 84 months, at the lowest end of the SGR. 
We have previously stated that the District Court need not “discuss and 
make findings as to each of the [relevant sentencing factors] if the record makes 
clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing.”  United States v. 
Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329).  The 
record demonstrates that the District Court heard and acknowledged the parties’ 
request for a downward departure, and denied it.  Although Judge Munley did not 
explicitly say, “I am denying a downward variance because of X,” it is clear from 
his remarks that the denial was based on the “violent streak” reflected by the nature 
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of the instant offense and Starkey’s prior criminal history.  This is as much 
explanation, if not more, than our cases require.   
Our review of the record establishes that the District Court “exercise[d] 
independent judgment [] based on a weighing of the relevant factors [] in arriving 
at [the] final sentence.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571-572 (3d Cir. 
2007) (en banc).  Because there was no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the 
sentence. 
